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Abstract: 
 
The role of leadership in the success and failure of organisations is a well-researched area. 
However, much of this research takes a very individualistic view of leadership and does not 
explore the other factors that define leadership behaviour. In addition, this focus is often on 
the negative emotions associated with poor leaders, rather than the role that positive emotion 
(or a lack of) play in the development of a leadership and organisational culture. This paper 
explores the role of leadership in the development of an institutional partnership that 
established a work-integration social enterprise (WISE) with public money. The research was 
carried out over a two-year period in three stages: an early, middle and late phase. Semi-
structured interviews were held with six of the Board members (three from each partner) as 
well as three of the senior WISE staff at each of the three stages (a total of 27 interviews). 
This partnership ultimately failed and the WISE is now a dormant company. The paper seeks 
to explain this failure by adopting a multi-theory analytical framework that includes ‘violent 
innocence’, ‘empathy’, and ‘partnership theory’ in order to show how a negative leadership 
style emerged at the WISE over time and ultimately led to its demise. 
 
 
Introduction: 
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This paper reports and explains the demise of a work integration social enterprise (WISE) set 
up by a newly created partnership between two institutions; a university (hitherto referred to 
as UNI) and a regional social enterprise development agency (hitherto referred to as SEDA). 
The ‘institutional partnership’ received financial support from an external, international 
funding body (hitherto referred to as FB) to set-up a WISE and to develop the social 
enterprise to financial sustainability. The FB and the institutional partnership anticipated that 
the process of set-up and development of the WISE would be successful and that this process 
would provide a model, which could be replicated by future institutional partnerships. 
Unfortunately, the institutional partnership ultimately disintegrated and the WISE became a 
dormant company. This paper seeks to explain this demise by combining prior academic 
theory on leadership, partnership and collaboration into one holistic theoretical model. 
Specifically, the paper draws upon the concept of ‘violent innocence’ in which leaders seek 
to dominate subordinates (or those colleagues with equal power status) through the creation 
of organisational structures to promote their authority and encourage obedience (Vince and 
Mazen, 2014).  
 
In addition, whilst the development of ‘violent innocence’ within an organisation has been 
predicated on negative human emotions and behaviours (Lazar, 2003; Fay, 2008; Pelzer, 
2005; Sims, 2005), this paper suggests that it is also a lack of positive emotions, namely 
empathy and shared intentionality (Hourdequin, 2012) that also promote such negative 
leadership behaviour. Furthermore, the paper seeks to move away from the overtly 
individualised approach to explaining the development of violent innocence proposed by 
Vince and Mazen (2014), in which individual leaders create organisational structures to 
promote their authority and encourage obedience, by exploring how organisational structures 
and funding streams also create the need for individual leaders to behave in such a way. In 
exploring these concepts the paper draws upon partnership and multi-stakeholder 
collaboration theory, in order to explain how such institutionalised factors (internal and 
external) also promote the development of ‘violent innocence’ and how this can ultimately 
lead to the demise of institutional partnerships between public and third sector organisations. 
In combining these theoretical approaches, this paper makes an original contribution to 
knowledge and also provides valuable insights to practitioners that are seeking to establish 
public-third sector institutional partnerships using third-party funding streams. 
Leadership and ‘Violent Innocence’: 
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‘Violent innocence’ is a form of individual and organisational denial about feelings, 
anxieties, perceptions and fears. It allows an individual to ignore or refuse to validate others’ 
perceptions of them by using power and authority to direct the blame elsewhere (Vince and 
Mazen, 2014). It is in effect a form of plausible deniability relating to the unpleasant things 
that leaders often do, allowing these negative actions to take place whilst ensuring that 
collectively they are not recognised. It allows an individual with authority over another to 
confuse or subjugate a subordinate, whilst at the same time being able to deny that this is 
what is occurring (Bollas, 1993). Indeed, Bollas (1993) states that this denial does not just 
emanate from the leader (or the individual with power), but that it is also the subjugated that 
enter into this ‘structure of innocence’. This acquiescence by the subjugated occurs in part 
because individuals have become socialised into the normative values of the 
leader/organisation that they work for (Vince and Mazen, 2014), but is also related to 
perceptions of self-interest (i.e. if I accept this situation I may secure a promotion or pay-
rise). This can also be argued as occurring within partnerships or multi-stakeholder 
collaborations, as the de jure ideal of equal partners or structures actively hides the de facto 
hierarchical structures that result from funding relationships (Whitehead, 2007; Fenwick et 
al., 2012). Therefore, dominant leaders or organisations in a partnership can seek to 
implement ‘violent innocence’ to achieve their ends, whilst at the same time as denying this 
within the ‘positive’ language of partnership. Conversely, subordinate organisations may not 
challenge this arrangement due to resource dependency or the perceived benefits that the 
‘partnership’ will bring to them. 
 
This culture of the implementation of ‘violent innocence’ by leaders and the acceptance of 
this by subordinates can produce a vicious cycle of self-replication in which the leader 
becomes increasingly assertive (and hence more ‘violent’), due to the passive dependence of 
staff on the leadership (which itself only increases proportionally with the leader’s 
assertiveness) (Kets de Vries, 2006). Such dependence positions the concept of violent 
innocence in the psycho-social realm, in which emotions and behaviours become crucial in 
the growth of unequal power relations and the continued subjugation of subordinates (Vince 
and Mazen, 2014). Prior research has identified that such violence has many specific forms 
that are based in negative human emotions and actions such as hatred, derision, contempt and 
indignation (Lazar, 2003; Fay, 2008; Pelzer, 2005; Sims, 2005). These perspectives however, 
ignore the role that positive emotions can play in defining the workplace, and how their 
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absence can also result in negative leadership behaviours. Specifically, empathy and shared 
intentionality have been shown in prior research to play an important role in the development 
of positive leadership behaviour (Kellett et al., 2006). 
 
Empathy and Shared Intentionality: 
 
In order for individuals to be moral, two key elements are required: attunement to others’ 
emotions through empathy and attunement, and to others’ ends through shared intentionality 
(Hourdequin, 2012). This has important implications for leadership research and in particular 
attempts to explain negative and positive leadership styles. Prior research by Kellett et al. 
(2006) identified that empathy was intrinsically linked with positive and effective leadership. 
However, in addition to this, the research also identified that empathy: “…helps explain a 
follower’s sense of emotional support that in turn sparks creativity and performance in 
[organisations]” (Kellett et al., 2006:158). Kets de Vries (2006) identified that when ‘violent 
innocence’ occurs the result is a vicious cycle of dependency in which the subordinates 
become increasingly subservient to the leader, who in turn becomes increasingly assertive 
and hence ‘violent’ with them. As empathetic leadership seemingly has the opposite effect by 
empowering followers and encouraging creativity and positive performance, it is proposed 
that the emergence of ‘violent innocence’ in leadership behaviour is partly the result of a lack 
of empathy and shared intentionality between the leader and their subordinates. Indeed, it is 
argued that empathy is a crucial leadership trait in developing bonds of trust between leaders 
and subordinates (Kellett et al., 2006; Cameron et al., 2003), without which negative 
leadership and follower behaviours can occur as positive emotions are not shared between 
individuals and hence bonds are not formed (Plutchik, 1987). If a leader has an inability to 
identify with the perceptions and goals of their subordinates (shared intention) then they lack 
the cognitive skills required for leadership (Wolf et al., 2002) and hence will seek to mask 
this inadequacy through the use of authority and power to direct the blame elsewhere (Vince 
and Mazen, 2014).  
 
Whilst the role of individual personalities and their emotions and behaviours are very 
important in shaping leadership styles and hence organisational performance, one should not 
focus solely on the personal to explain leadership. Indeed, organisational structures and 
external factors can also affect leadership styles and behaviour. In explaining the 
development of ‘teams’ within organisations the environment created within an organisation 
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has been shown to be crucial in determining whether a group of individuals becomes an 
effective ‘performing team’ (Sheard and Kakabadse, 2002). This is even more important 
when operating in environments that have been created by institutional partnerships or 
collaborations, as multiple structures, aims and leadership personalities can be operating at 
any one time. In this scenario, no one organisational structure or leader is solely driving the 
performance of the organisation or the leadership styles adopted. Indeed, a board of directors 
representing the interests of the partner organisations instead hold power and authority within 
the organisation in question. It is therefore important to explore partnership and collaboration 
theory in order to develop a holistic understanding of leadership and its role in shaping 
performance. 
 
Institutional Partnerships and collaborations: 
 
A partnership is a multi-stakeholder arrangement in which different stakeholders seek to take 
common ownership of a problem, as well as committing to solving these and using each 
partners’ strengths to improve collective organisational performance (Coulter, 1999; Gallant 
et al., 2002). In theory, a partnership is a non-hierarchical structure within which all partners 
have equal status and input into strategic operations (Coulter, 1999) and is concerned with 
describing the merging of the several partners (Carnwell and Carson, 2008). When a 
partnership has been established the new partners engage in ‘collaboration’, through which 
they work to solve common problems (Carnwell and Carson, 2008). The terms ‘partnership’ 
and ‘collaboration’ are often used interchangeably (Hazenberg and Hall, 2014) but they are 
two different concepts that relate to the same phenomenon. The establishment of partnerships 
and multi-stakeholder collaborations has become increasingly popular in solving social 
problems, as it is seen as a good way to maximise civil society involvement (Fenwick, Miller 
and McTavish, 2012). 
 
Partnerships can be formal (i.e. have a legal status) that commits the partners to certain 
structures and actions (Rose, 1994) or informal, in which mutual interest drives partner 
engagement and action (Domberger et al., 1997). For the purposes of this research, the focus 
of the study was on formalised partnerships, in which a new legal organisational form is 
created that embodies the partnership and acts as a vehicle for its actions and outcomes. This 
can be defined as an ‘institutional partnership’ (this concept is explored in more detail 
below). Whilst there are numerous benefits associated with partnerships in general, for 
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instance the provision of added-value (Steijn et al., 2011); democratic decision-making 
processes (Guest and Peccei, 1997); and enhanced employee rights/engagement (Roche, 
2009); there are also many possible negative outcomes to engaging in partnerships. Indeed, 
partnerships are viewed as highly dependent relationships (Steijn et al., 2011) in which one 
partner’s failure can adversely affect other stakeholders. In addition, partnerships have been 
shown to be extremely time-consuming and resource-intensive (Huxham, 2003) and prone to 
communication problems (either deliberate such as the withholding of information, or 
accidental) (Currie, Finn and Martin, 2007; Dawes, Cresswell and Pardo, 2009). Partnerships 
can also involve partners pursuing their own goals and agendas (Martin, 2010) and where 
hidden structures (usually relating to funding arrangements) can subvert the formalised 
decision-making structures (Whitehead, 2007; Fenwick et al., 2012). All of these potential 
problems can damage the formation of trust between partners (Domberger et al., 1997) and 
perhaps explains why so many partnerships end in failure (Weiner et al., 2000). 
 
When institutional partnerships form social enterprises they tend to be more ‘conflictional’ 
than single-stakeholder social enterprises (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009). This conflict 
can be based upon “delegate syndrome” (i.e. when a board member represents particular 
stakeholder interests rather than acting in the overall interests of the social enterprise) 
(Mosley, Maronick and Katz, 2012). This delegation often results in the appointment of 
CEOs by the board that then employ inadequate management monitoring systems, which 
result in the failure of the social enterprise (Pearce, 2006). Partnership formation is therefore 
a complex and difficult process to engage with, and whilst the results can be very positive, 
they can also be extremely negative. However, whilst the problems of partnership formation 
and the outcomes of these are well understood, the underlying causes behind the breakdown 
of formalised partnerships have not been holistically understood. Instead, prior research has 
focused upon the independent roles of poor leadership (Martin, 2010; Mosley, Maronick and 
Katz, 2012); unsuitable organisational structures (Whitehead, 2007; Fenwick et al., 2012); 
and ineffective communication between partners (Currie, Finn and Martin, 2007; Dawes, 
Cresswell and Pardo, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
Summary: 
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The literature reviewed above has provided an overview of the prior literature surrounding 
leadership theory (and specifically the concept of violent innocence); the role of personality 
traits in leadership (empathy and shared intentionality) and partnership theory in explaining 
organisational success/failure. It is proposed within this study that conceptualising the 
development of an institutional partnership through a lens of empathy and shared 
intentionality, provides an explanation for the leadership styles adopted within the 
organisation and hence the reasons behind the success or failure of said organisation. In this 
instance, as the organisation failed, the research posits that the failure of the board of 
directors to build empathy and shared intentionality within the organisation led to a culture of 
‘violent innocence’ and ultimately the demise of the institutional partnership.  
 
Research Aims 
 
The research aimed to reveal the development of the ‘institutional partnership’ and to record 
its progress in successfully/unsuccessfully developing the WISE to financial sustainability. 
Specifically, it sought to explore this success/failure in relation to the below three specific 
research questions: 
 
1. The impact of affective cognitive factors on the development of organisational culture 
and leadership behaviour. 
 
2. The impact of organisational factors (governance and funding) on the development of 
organisational culture and leadership behaviour. 
 
3. How the organisational culture that developed: 
a. Impacted upon leadership style; 
b. Contributed to the success/failure of the institutional partnership. 
 
 
 
 
 
Method 
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Participants: 
 
Interview data was collected at three discreet points in time: the early phase (time 1); the 
middle phase (time 2); and the late phase (time 3). The total number of participants 
interviewed at all three data collection points was 9 and consisted of 3 directors representing 
UNI, 3 directors representing SEDA and 3 members of the WISE staff. All participants were 
assured of anonymity in the research process so as to ensure that honest and true accounts of 
their experience were collected.  
 
Procedure: 
 
At all three data collection points, all participants engaged in individual semi-structured 
interviews with a researcher. The interview schedule was semi-structured in nature so as to 
ensure that issues relating to participant’s experiences, emotions, and organisational 
perceptions were captured, but that the participants were also free to discuss any areas that 
they felt were important. This process resulted in twenty seven interviews, which were 
recorded and transcribed for future analysis. 
 
Analysis: 
 
The interviews used a narrative approach (Reissman, 1993) in order to elicit participant’s 
perspectives and their understanding of the development of the institutional partnership and 
the drive towards achieving sustainability. These narratives were collected during the three 
phases of the research, in order that the ‘story’ behind the development of the institutional 
partnership could be told. Common themes across these three phases were identified so that 
the changes within the organisation could be more clearly understood throughout the two 
years that the institutional partnership was active. Specifically, change was viewed in relation 
to leadership style, organisational culture and the experience of working within the 
partnership.  The approach to the data analysis was both inductive and iterative, as whilst the 
researchers were familiar with the prior literature surrounding leadership, 
partnership/collaboration and empathy/shared intentionality, the research did not test any pre-
determined set of hypotheses or choose a model a priori, but instead used the data to develop 
a theoretical understanding (Feldman et al., 2004). The analysis focused on the stories of how 
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the participants ‘made sense’ of the institutional partnership (Weick, 1995) with the main 
narrative themes emerging from the data being ‘Communication’, ‘Funding Body Influence’, 
‘Partnership Cohesion’, ‘Leadership’, ‘Sustainability and ‘Organisational Change’ (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). These participant perceptions were then related to the prior leadership, 
partnership and cognitive behaviour literature, with violent innocence, empathy/shared 
intentionality, and institutional partnership theory emerging as the analytical base. This 
allowed the analysis to not only identify commonalities with the prior research, but also 
allowed the research to build a holistic theoretical model of the development of institutional 
partnerships between public and third sector organisations using public funding streams. 
 
Results 
 
The narrative themes to emerge from the data analysis are presented below, with exemplar 
quotes provided to demonstrate the emergence of the themes. As the data was collected at 
three different points in time example quotes for each theme from each phase of the research 
are provided to demonstrate the changes that occurred over time. Additional quotes are then 
provided during the discussion to support the theoretical propositions made by the research. 
However, first there is an exploration of what happened to the institutional partnership over 
its lifetime in order to provide context to the reader in relation to the data. 
 
The ‘story’ of the institutional partnership and the WISE: 
 
Work on the development of the work integration social enterprise (WISE) began during the 
early part of 2008. This initial work was undertaken by a group of interested parties and 
resulted in a bid for funding being submitted by SEDA and UNI to a European funding 
stream in August 2009. The funding bid was successful and ultimately led to the formation of 
the partnership and the WISE, which began trading in March 2010. The aim of the WISE was 
to assist young people not in employment, education or training (NEET), unemployed 
graduates and unemployed professionals back into work through work experience and 
education/training programmes. The FB agreed to provide funding for the first two years of 
the WISEs existence, which could be used to establish the WISE and finance its running costs 
over that period. The aim of the project at the end of the two-years of funding was to become 
sustainable. This sustainability was never achieved, and whilst the project targets set by the 
FB were all met the WISE became a dormant company in August 2012. 
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Theme A - Communication: 
 
This theme was recurrently negative throughout the three phases of the research, as 
communication (especially between the board and the staff) was poor. In the early phase of 
the partnership the board of directors did not meet often and when they did meet it was often 
to ‘firefight’ crises as opposed to build strategic direction. 
 
“I would say communication is OK but distant. I mean we communicate via emails, 
we don’t have frequent meetings and in an ideal world we ought really to set aside 
some time to meet not when we’re confronting a crisis but when we are actually 
trying to establish a strategy”. (SEDA Director – Early Phase) 
 
By the middle phase of the project this had not improved and the staff felt that there was a 
serious lack of direction coming from the board of directors about the strategic priorities of 
the institutional partnership. 
 
“The quality of the communication from the top down from management down is 
terrible. There’s no clear goals, there’s no.....nothing is clear, everything is wishy-
washy and like a fantasy like this is....nothing’s actually got like a clear out goal 
there’s no clear communication from the top down to the team about what we are 
supposed to do. Nothing, there is like a complete barrier of communication 
downwards and all the team feel it or felt it.” (WISE Staff – Middle Phase) 
 
By the end of the project this lack of communication had become part of the general apathy 
surrounding the institutional partnership, as the partner institutions and the board members 
accepted that the partnership and the WISE would not continue beyond the end of the funding 
project. 
 
“Another example is that the communication between the board, they obviously know, 
they’ve known for a long time probably that things were not going to carry on much 
longer because they haven’t got the money and they aren’t doing anything to make it 
carry on so they must have known that but our contract ends in September.” (SEDA 
Director – Late Phase) 
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Theme B – Funding Body Influence: 
 
This theme was characterised by the often negative effects of the reporting requirements put 
in place by the Funding Body, which was seen as time-consuming and detracted from the 
goal of working towards sustainability. In the early phase of the WISE the staff were 
struggling to ‘get to grips’ with the different reporting formats and this was causing a lot of 
time to be spent/lost on amending problems with paperwork. 
 
“There can’t be one mistake on the form, it can’t be crossed out and initialled over, a 
new form has to be completed. After going through reams of forms and speaking to 
over a hundred people and filling in over a hundred forms for instance, it was found 
out that there were seven different styles of this one particular form on the company 
hard drive and nobody had gone in every time one was amended and deleted the old 
one off.”  (WISE Staff – Early Phase) 
 
Following the resignation of CEO 1 the middle phase was characterised by a push from the 
board of directors (that included one of the Directors becoming an acting CEO) to get back 
on track with the Funding Body’s reporting requirements. Indeed, this was almost the sole 
focus of the interim CEO, as opposed to driving towards sustainability. 
 
‘I think with me going in to fill that void when CEO left my focus was on primarily 
ensuring that existing contracts were delivered so there would be no ‘claw-back’, 
there would be no contractual issues and that we could actually start having some 
successes around delivery. And I think to a large extent that’s been achieved in terms 
of numbers going through the matched funding elements or the outputs required for 
the matched funding elements of the programme have been hit.” (UNI Director – 
Middle Phase) 
 
The Funding Body requirements ultimately culminated in the failure of the WISE to achieve 
sustainability once the funded project ended. Indeed, this was acknowledged in the Late 
Phase of the research, with the almost perverse outcome that despite the failure to achieve the 
project aim of sustainability the Funding Body was happy because the project outcomes had 
been achieved. 
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“From a contract point of view, I think the delivery and everything that [Institutional 
Partnership] is doing down there they’ve actually achieved the entire contract that 
they were contracted to do. And the one remaining contract [that] at the moment is in 
place, the funders are quite happy with the direction and are actually quite pleased 
with some of the results and the direction that it is going in. So, I think from that point 
of view, if you look at the delivery and the contracts, everyone’s been quite happy.” 
(SEDA Director – Late Phase] 
 
Theme C – Partnership Cohesion: 
 
Perhaps one of the most important factors in the failure of the WISE commercially, was the 
demise of the institutional partnership itself. This was characterised by a lack of clear vision 
of what the different partner’s roles were, how the governance structure chosen would be 
implemented in relation to strategic goal-setting and by an inability of the Board of Directors 
to leave the interests of their parent organisations at the door. In the early phase of the WISE 
this was not necessarily recognised by board members, as the project was still in its infancy 
and so the problems within the partnership had not yet become evident. 
 
“So, I guess it’s been good to discover there is not a big conflict within the board in 
any sense. I think there is a fair degree of unanimity between all the six members of 
the board in fact, even though they come at it from rather different perspectives. 
There was a possibility in any particular joint venture of this nature that there could 
be a kind of them and us position between SEDA nominated members and the UNI 
nominated members. But I don’t perceive that to be an issue.” (SEDA Director – 
Early Phase) 
 
However, by the middle phase of the project the fractures in the relationships between the 
partners were becoming to be recognised, with some participants already articulating a belief 
that some Directors (particularly from the UNI side) had already mentally disengaged from 
the project. Interestingly, one of the advocates of this view was a UNI Director. 
 
“Some of the key things were about meeting the reporting and hierarchical needs of 
UNI, the lack of shared vision between SEDA and UNI, but also a lack of vision from 
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UNI. I think certain directors have taken the view that they will just sit on the side-
lines and watch it nose-dive and then stand aside and say well we knew it would go 
wrong, rather than pro-actively promoting it and try to move it forward.” (UNI 
Director – Middle Phase). 
 
By the late phase the partnership had completely broken down and both of the institutional 
partners were seeking favourable exits from the arrangement for their organisations. This was 
exacerbated by the appointment of a new CEO to SEDA, who did not see the value in the 
WISE or the institutional partnership, and also did not personally get on with one of the UNI 
Directors. 
 
“SEDA took on a new CEO who fell out big time with [UNI Director]. They had a 
stand up row and we never really got past that. He actually came in with the intention 
that he wanted [Institutional Partnership] to fold. He couldn’t see the point he couldn’t 
see the purpose. It was a total distraction but I think more importantly what has 
happened is he also saw that there was a funding stream that he was having to share 
with [UNI] to keep [Institutional Partnership] going. If he could end that relationship 
the funding stream would then go into SEDA.” (UNI Director – Late Phase) 
 
Theme D – Leadership: 
 
Leadership (or a lack of it) was the most critical factor in the failure of the institutional 
partnership and hence the WISE. There remained a lack of strategic vision and leadership 
from the Board of Directors, who often blamed the CEO or staff for not understanding what 
the aims of the partnership were. This was recognised by the staff even in the early phase of 
the project, and can also be evidenced by the fact that the WISE had three CEOs during the 
two years of the project, all of whom failed to build in sustainability to the WISE. 
 
“[WISE Staff Member] and I are both mature members of the team. We’ve had prior 
experience of the workplace and different management roles. Understanding that 
vision and that overall objective would explain some of the management decisions 
that have taken place; but I don’t have sight of that so it’s very difficult to justify the 
management style at times.” (WISE Staff – Early Phase) 
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By the middle phase of the WISE this failure was beginning to lead to a culture of blame 
within the partnership. Indeed, the Board of Directors (whilst recognising some of their 
limitations) blamed the initial CEO for the problems. The staff were unsure as to the reasons 
for a lack of leadership but were desperate for it to emerge from somewhere. During this 
phase the third CEO was recruited, but unfortunately this only exacerbated the problems as 
he was generally perceived by both the staff and the board as lacking the necessary skills to 
reverse the demise of the WISE. 
 
“I don’t think we are really collectively and in some cases individually really willing 
to do things for the good of the company. I think that is a problem. If we had a strong 
and effective CEO you could side-line the board and that wouldn’t matter but given 
that we haven’t, the board does need to do things. It comes along and it talks, I’m not 
really sure it ever decides anything and I don’t think its actual contribution to the 
business is very good.” (UNI Director – Middle Phase) 
 
By the late phase of the project this lack of leadership and the placement of blame had been 
replaced to a degree by apathy as the Board of Directors accepted that the WISE would fail 
and both institutional partners looked for suitable exits from the partnership. Nevertheless, 
despite some recognition of the Board’s failings by its members, the CEO and the staff within 
it were still seen as responsible for the failure.  
 
“I think the directors collectively didn’t succeed, which is a way of saying failed I 
suppose. Because once [CEO 2] stopped being acting CEO frankly the thing didn’t 
progress. I am disappointed with the performance of the company and some of the 
individuals in it. It seems to me they didn’t get so many of the basics right and we as 
directors, we did pick up that it wasn’t being addressed and we did say this should 
happen but we were unable or unwilling to force it to happen.” (UNI Director – Late 
Phase) 
 
 
 
Theme E – Sustainability: 
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This theme was concerned with the WISE’s drive towards sustainability, which in the end 
was not achieved. From the early phases of the project there was doubt about the efficacy of 
creating a large and sustainable WISE using public funding, due to the nature of the 
organisational structures being designed around the funded project rather than with the sole 
intention of being a sustainable business. 
 
“I think it comes down to the fact that it is quite difficult to set up a relatively large 
organisation with complex activity through funding, which then allows you to employ 
a number of people who have to then function collaboratively and then to look at how 
to sustain that activity beyond the period of funding when perhaps the activities have 
been designed around a funding stream rather than necessarily around a business 
approach that would allow you to be able to sell some of those services in the open 
market or public sector market.”  (SEDA Director – Early Phase). 
 
By the middle phase of the partnership the problems that had been experienced in the early 
phase of the project were already being used to explain the lack of sustainability. Indeed, it 
was felt that a further two years would be needed to achieve sustainability, even though the 
WISE at this point was almost 18 months into the two years of funding. 
 
“In reality, 18 months with the problems that we have had in terms of the team, it’s 
not enough to get from zero to sustainable; it’s going to need another couple of years. 
People like [other UNI Director] have got to consider what the hell they’re doing sat 
round that [boardroom] table.” (UNI Director – Middle Phase) 
 
By the late phase of the project the Board of Directors were lamenting the missed 
opportunities that had occurred during the two years of the project. It was felt that failure to 
recruit a suitable CEO, along with failings on the board had contributed to the lack of 
sustainability achieved within the organisation. 
 
“I think there were big opportunities for [Institutional Partnership] to become 
sustainable and make its way independently following the programme but I think they 
have not been acted upon for a number of reasons. You know the board, the leader, 
the manager going, probably not having the right person in place. I think there’s been 
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opportunities missed and I think it will be a shame if this divide between SEDA and 
UNI, if it all just has been for nothing.” (SEDA Director – Late Phase] 
 
Theme F – Organisational Change: 
 
The final theme related to organisational change throughout the two years of the programme 
and as such only appeared in the data for the middle and late phases of the project, as it 
related to perceived changes in the WISE following the initial early phase. During the middle 
phase of the project despite the significant problems and management/structural changes it 
was still felt by board members that the overall aims of the project had not changed. 
However, it was also felt that the reductions in funding and the need to find sustainable 
sources of income, alongside ineffective management changes, were affecting the 
organisations ability to pursue this mission. 
 
“No, I don’t believe there have been any fundamental changes in the purpose of (the 
WISE) since we last spoke. I mean my recollection is that we have this organisation 
designed to encourage education, employment and enterprise and I believe that those 
purposes still apply to [Institutional Partnership] and I think that the changes in 
management that have occurred, various different changes over the period of time 
have not actually fundamentally altered what it is that the organisation is seeking to 
achieve.” (SEDA Director – Middle Phase) 
 
“I think there has definitely been a change as the funding is drying up now. There’s a 
change in....we haven’t really got a direction at the minute about whether we are 
going down that route [funded project] or whether we are going to be going 
commercial. It seems like we are stuck in limbo at the moment.” (WISE Staff – 
Middle Phase) 
 
By the late phase of the project the organisation had become an entity without a mission, over 
and above satisfactorily completing the funded project. The lack of leadership from the Board 
of Directors and the lack of a CEO (CEO 3 had by now resigned) had left staff morale 
extremely low and any focus on sustainability was by now gone. The staff were critical of 
this lack of direction, yet still looking for leadership. 
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“At the minute there is no purpose. We haven’t got a purpose our only job is to finish 
our [Funding Body] contract, which we are not doing very successfully. The purpose 
of helping people and our project has disappeared so I don’t see a purpose anymore. 
I am working off my own steam. I haven’t got any boss really. [SEDA Director] comes 
down once every now and again to try to help us then I just do what she wants. I’m 
already doing it anyway.’ It [morale] is extremely low because we have not had any 
guidance or any manager really. They [the board] gave us a future plan when [CEO 
3] first left and that was the end of that. It was a future plan that lasted like about five 
minutes and then that was it.” (WISE Staff – Late Phase) 
 
Discussion  
 
The data outlined above in the results section outlines the development of the WISE during 
the two years that it existed, by providing three snapshots in time in which the participants 
could reflect on the developments to date. This overview presents a story of how the 
leadership provided by the board of directors changed over time in relation to the changing 
priorities of the partner organisations and the evolving requirements of the business model 
and the funding body. These results are now discussed in relation to the prior literature 
outlined earlier on violent innocence, institutional partnerships, multi-stakeholder 
collaborations and empathy/shared intentionality. This discussion is presented 
chronologically in relation to the three phases of data collection in order to demonstrate these 
changes and the individual and organisational factors that drove them. Participant quotes are 
used to contextualise the theoretical arguments. 
 
Early Phase: 
 
The early phase of the partnership was characterised by optimism, recognition of the 
challenge ahead (particularly regarding sustainability) and an inability to recognise the 
problems that already existed at board level and within the partnership. This latter failure to 
identify the problems within the partnership can be viewed as demonstrating the beginnings 
of a leadership culture of ‘violent innocence’, as the organisation as a whole was in denial 
(Vince and Mazen, 2014). This was typified by poor direction from the board characterised 
by a lack of communication, which resulted from infrequent and irregular board meetings. 
Such problems are a well-recognised issue for new institutional partnerships (Currie et al., 
18 
 
2007; Dawes et al., 2009), and in this case this lack of engagement from the board and the 
resulting lack of communication to the staff and the original CEO were critical in the crisis 
that occurred at the end of the early phase. The growth of violent innocence within the 
organisation was typified by the board’s perception of the original CEO, who they blamed for 
many of the problems (see the quote below). The board clearly sought to subjugate the CEO 
(Bollas, 1993) and were sometimes derisory in their behaviour towards her (Fay, 2008). In 
particular, the reportable data required by the Funding Body was seen as the CEO’s 
responsibility, and whilst she must take some of the blame for this [research by Pearce (2006) 
has pointed out that this is the responsibility of a social enterprise CEO], the lack of direction 
as to whether the core mission was delivering a funded project or achieving sustainability 
must rest with the board as the strategic decision-makers. 
 
“I don’t want to lay all the blame on CEO because she’s not here but there were 
discussions, certainly in steering group, as to what the numbers were and there were 
meetings with CEO separately to go through outputs and things. So she should have 
understood what the outputs [a Funding Body requirement] were and how she 
communicated those to the staff team and that seems to be where it broke down.” 
(SEDA Director – Early Phase) 
 
Within this the board also from the very formation of the WISE struggled to leave their 
parent institution’s interests out of their decision-making processes. Again, this is a common 
problem in institutional partnerships (Martin, 2006) and has been shown to be prevalent in 
social enterprises established as partnerships as well (Mosley et al., 2006). This was also 
complicated by the structure of the institutional partnership. Indeed, whilst the partnership 
was meant to be equal, the differing roles of the institutional partners meant that de facto 
pockets of power existed. SEDA controlled and were responsible for the funding that was 
supplied by the FB, and so were more likely to push for the contract deliverables to be 
prioritised over the social mission or drive for sustainability. In contrast, the original idea for 
the WISE had been the idea of one of the UNI directors and so he was more committed to the 
beneficiaries and the social mission. This put him at odds even with the other directors from 
UNI, who usually considered the interests of the University over and above those of the 
WISE, as is shown in the quote below.  
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“We knew he was going to act in the way he does because, quite reasonably from his 
point of view, he acts in what he sees to be the interests of [UNI]. And I think he 
sometimes misunderstands the role of the director, which is to act in the best interests 
of the company. I think he sometimes finds it difficult to separate the two.” (UNI 
Director – Early Phase). 
 
There was therefore an extremely fractured strategic decision-making structure beginning to 
emerge at the end of the early phase of the project, which was causing problems in both 
delivering the funded project targets and in seeking to achieve sustainability. It is proposed 
by the researchers that these problems were the result of a lack of empathy within the 
organisation. Indeed, whilst the board all empathised with the WISE’s beneficiaries, they 
were not emotionally attuned or empathetic to the needs of their CEO or their staff 
(Hourdequin, 2012). This lack of empathy was in part driven by individuals pursuing their 
own agendas and partly by the requirements of the FB and the unclear organisational 
structure of the WISE (in de facto terms). These pressures when combined with the lack of 
empathy led to negative leadership behaviours (Lazar, 2003; Fay, 2008; Pelzer, 2005; Sims, 
2005) and hence violent innocence (Vince and Mazen, 2014). This was already being 
recognised by the WISE staff in this early phase, although for their own personal self-interest 
(i.e. keeping their job) they did not challenge this (Kets de Vries, 2006). The below quote 
exemplifies this recognition. 
 
“I think the group dynamics and the harmony within [WISE sub-department] has 
fallen apart, utterly fallen apart. And I am sure that [Staff member] and [Staff 
member] would crucify me for saying that. But I don’t think that it’s either of their 
faults at all. But it has, the cohesion there is......it’s been undermined [by the 
leadership] to a point where it is just collapsing.”  (WISE Staff – Early Phase) 
 
Middle Phase: 
 
The middle phase of the project saw the situation quickly deteriorate to the point where the 
original CEO resigned and was replaced in an interim capacity by one of the UNI directors. 
At this point temporary direction was provided by CEO 2 in the need for full focus to be put 
on meeting the FB requirements (as they were well behind their targets). Whilst at this stage 
the drive towards achieving sustainability was temporarily suspended, in reality this was 
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permanent as sustainability never reappeared (in any meaningful way) back on the strategic 
agenda. The blame culture continued to grow within the WISE, with the ex-CEO and the staff 
increasingly being blamed by the Board for the current failings of the WISE. This blame was 
centred on an inability of the staff to be entrepreneurial and the role of the FB in undermining 
entrepreneurship through onerous reporting schedules (as the below quote exemplifies). It is 
argued that the direction of blame elsewhere was a case of the Board using their power and 
authority to divert attention away from their own failings and identifies the growth of violent 
innocence within the organisation (Vince and Mazen, 2014).  
 
“The projects seem to drive out the ability to be entrepreneurial and I think it is very 
difficult for the board to be entrepreneurial on behalf of the organisation. The board 
has to stimulate entrepreneurship within the organisation and has by and large failed 
to do that to achieve that.” (UNI Director – Middle Phase) 
 
Communication between the Board members remained problematic and despite the ongoing 
organisational crisis it was felt that emailing each other between meetings would prove an 
adequate solution (see the quote below). This level of denial only grew within the board and 
further exemplifies the culture of violent innocence that was emerging (Vince and Mazen, 
2014). It is proposed that this lack of regular and ‘real’ personal contact only exacerbated the 
lack of empathy within the WISE between the Board members (and the CEO and staff), 
which exacerbated the growing problems in the partnership (Hourdequin, 2012). This 
emotional detachment contributed to the increase in negative leadership behaviours and 
emotions such as hatred, derision, contempt and indignation (Lazar, 2003; Fay, 2008; Pelzer, 
2005; Sims, 2005), which would ‘bubble to the surface’ between some board members in the 
late phase. 
 
“I think we are communicating more frequently mostly still by email between the 
board meetings.” (SEDA Director – Middle Phase) 
  
These problems were further exacerbated when a third CEO was appointed at the end of the 
middle phase. He was instantly disliked by the staff and the Board recognised that they had 
made a mistake in appointing him. The new CEO’s responsibility was to drive the WISE 
forwards to sustainability but his prior experience was all in delivering funded projects. His 
leadership style was very withdrawn and he did not seek to build empathetic relationships 
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with the staff (Hourdequin, 2012), nor to gain the trust of the Board or the staff (Domberger 
et al., 1997). This only added to the increasingly prominent culture of violent innocence 
within the WISE, as the Board and the staff had no confidence in the new CEO and 
increasingly some board members (particularly one of the UNI Directors) began to mentally 
withdraw from the project. 
 
“I think the chief executive [CEO 3] has done exactly what we told him not to do, 
which is move out of the room where all the team are and take himself off to a room 
upstairs. And when I saw that, I thought oh dear because he is clearly seen as a clown 
by the team; that was obvious in Sweden. He made no attempt whatsoever to speak to 
his team. They made no attempt to speak to him to such an extent it was...and I 
expected being over there we might talk business but no. No, he’s not going to do it; 
he’s not going to make it.” (UNI Director – Middle Phase) 
  
“‘He [CEO 3] hasn’t got a leadership style, he is not a leader, he’s all talk there’s no 
actual management situations and stuff. It’s all ‘phaff’ if that’s a real word.’” (WISE 
Staff – Middle Phase) 
 
Late Phase: 
 
By the late phase of the project the partnership was disintegrating and the organisation was 
merely focused on successfully completing the funded project (in relation to the FB’s 
reportables). It was during this phase that the culture of violent innocence fully came to the 
fore, with negative emotions and personality clashes occurring within the Board and CEO 3 
resigning from the company. During this phase the SEDA recruited a new CEO who did not 
see the value of the partnership and was reluctant to share the funding stream that SEDA 
controlled. Due to this the partnership began to fall apart very quickly, as UNI resented 
SEDA’s attempts to exert the power it held through the funding arrangements to control 
decisions relating to the WISE. This brought to the fore the de facto hierarchical structure that 
existed due to the funding relationship (Whitehead, 2007; Fenwick et al., 2012) and provides 
a clear example of ‘violent innocence’ occurring within the Board as the SEDA CEO sought 
to further his organisation’s ends. 
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“I think when [New CEO at SEDA] got involved communication was going to break 
down one way or another. [New CEO at SEDA] had made it very clear to me that he 
didn’t see the point. He didn’t see the reason the purpose and wanted out anyway. 
With [him] coming in I think it was always going to be that SEDA would drop out. It 
was just the nature of that separation became an issue.” (UNI Director – Late Phase) 
  
However, the arrival of the new SEDA CEO was really just the ‘final straw’ as it brought to 
the surface all of the problems that had existed within the partnership from the early phase 
onwards. The lack of communication (Currie et al., 2007; Dawes et al., 2009); the ‘delegate 
syndrome’ of some of the Directors on the Board (Mosley et al., 2012); the blame culture that 
existed towards the staff and CEOs (Vince and Mazen, 2014); and the pressures from the FB 
for reportable data (Whitehead, 2007; Fenwick et al., 2012); had all contributed to creating an 
organisational leadership in which violent innocence and negative emotions pervaded (Lazar, 
2003; Fay, 2008; Pelzer, 2005; Sims, 2005). The organisation was devoid of empathy and 
shared intention (at least internally) (Hourdequin, 2012) and exacerbated by a staff that was 
subordinated and confused (Vince and Mazen, 2014). This created an environment in which 
entrepreneurial behaviour was inhibited and real direction was lacking in the drive towards 
sustainability (and often even in delivering the funded project). At the end of the project this 
was perhaps even recognised by some of the Directors, as one stated when discussing the lack 
of strategic vision. 
 
“It’s the classic case of go into it without a clear idea of what it is and what the 
objectives are, engage the processes and get bogged down with the nitty-gritty and 
wonder after a period of time why it’s not going anywhere. Alice in wonderland when 
you come to the fork in the road and she asks “Which way do I go?” and the March 
Hare says something like “Well where do you want to get to?” and she says “Well I 
don’t really know” and he says “Well it doesn’t matter which way you go then does 
it?” [Laughs]” (UNI Director – Late Phase) 
 
Theorising the performance of an institutional partnership: 
 
In theorising the performance of an institutional partnership established as a WISE this paper 
makes an original contribution to knowledge by combining theory on the role of negative 
leadership behaviour (violent innocence) and positive emotions (empathy and shared 
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intentionality); with an organisational focus on institutional partnerships and funding streams 
(see Figure 1 below). This cognitive/organisational theoretical hybrid allows for a more 
nuanced and holistic understanding of the reasons behind the failures of institutional 
partnerships, and hence seeks to contribute to academic and practitioner understanding of 
organisational failure. Indeed, the case-study presented in this paper provides a perfect 
example of exactly what not to do when establishing an institutional partnership with public 
funding. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 above outlines the role that both cognitive and organisational factors have in shaping 
the success (or otherwise) of an institutional partnership. In this model it is proposed that 
conceptualising the development of an institutional partnership as a two-way, hybrid entity in 
which individuals (through their behaviour) can shape performance and organisational 
structure; but within which organisational structure and funding arrangements can also affect 
individual behaviour; means that the development of leadership styles and staff engagement 
can be explained more holistically. Within this analytical framework, if the leadership style 
adopted is positive, then a culture of empathy (Hourdequin, 2012) and trust (Domberger et 
al., 1997) develops and the management and staff within the organisation become an 
effective team (Sheard and Kakabadse, 2002). However, if the cognitive and organisational 
factors within the partnership lead to negative leadership behaviour then a culture of violent 
innocence pervades (Vince and Mazen, 2014) and the organisation ultimately fails (like many 
partnerships) (Weiner et al., 2000). 
 
Summary 
 
This paper has sought to identify the reasons behind the failure of an institutional partnership 
that established a WISE using public funding. In exploring this it has demonstrated that both 
cognitive and organisational factors determine success or failure and that both can impact on 
each other. It is proposed that the case-study that was examined in this research failed 
because a lack of empathy, shared intentionality and hence ultimately trust failed to develop 
between the Board of Directors and the staff within the WISE (Hourdequin, 2012; 
Domberger et al., 1997). This failure to develop positive emotions and leadership styles 
within the WISE led to a culture of violent innocence developing in which the usual problems 
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of partnerships (poor communication; delegate syndrome; hidden power structures; funding 
pressures) flourished (Currie et al., 2007; Dawes et al., 2009; Mosley et al., 2012; Whitehead, 
2007; Fenwick et al., 2012). This led to the growth of a culture of violent innocence (Vince 
and Mazen, 2014) and ultimately to the failure of the WISE. This paper is limited by its 
single case-study organisation and hence its small dataset. However, the theory proposed 
offers useful insights to academics and practitioners that can be both tested in future research 
and future institutional partnerships. 
 
References 
 
Bollas, C., (1993), Being a character: Psychoanalysis and self-experience, London, UK: 
Routledge. 
 
Cameron, K., Dutton, J., and Quinn, R., (2003) Positive organisational scholarships: 
Foundations of a new discipline, Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco.  
 
Carnwell, R and Carson, A. (2009) The concepts of partnership and collaboration in 
Carnwell, R. and Buchanan, J. Effective Practice in Health, Social Care and Criminal 
Justice, (2nd Edition), Open University Press. 
 
Coulter, A., (1999), Paternalism or Partnership? British Medical Journal, 319, pp. 719–720. 
 
Currie, G., Finn, R. & Martin, G., (2007), Spanning boundaries in pursuit of effective 
knowledge sharing within networks in the NHS, Journal of Health Organisation and 
Management, 21(4-5), pp. 406–417. 
 
Dawes, S., Cresswell, A. & Pardo, T.A., (2009), From “need to know” to “need to share”: 
Tangled problems, information boundaries, and the building of public sector knowledge 
networks, Public Administration Review, 69(3), pp. 392-402. 
 
Domberger, S., Farago, S. & Fernandez, P., (1997), Public & Private Sector Partnering: A 
Re-Appraisal, Public Administration, 75(4), pp. 777-787. 
 
Fay, E., (2008), Derision and management, Organization, 15, pp. 831–850. 
 
Feldman, M. S., Sköldberg, K., Brown, R. and Horner, D. (2004) ‘Making sense of stories: A 
rhetorical approach to narrative analysis,’ Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 14(2), pp. 147–70. 
 
Fenwick, J., Miller, K. & McTavish, D., (2012), Co-governance or meta-democracy: 
Perspectives of local governance ‘partnership’ in England and Scotland, Policy & Politics, 
40(3), pp. 405-422. 
 
Gallant, M.H., Beaulieu, M.C. & Carnevale, F.A., (2002), Partnership: An Analysis of the 
Concept within the Nurse-client Relationship, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 40(2), pp. 149–
157. 
25 
 
 
Guest, D. & Peccei, R., (1997), The Partnership Company: Benchmarks for The Future, IPA, 
London. 
 
Hazenberg, R. & Hall, K., (2014), Public Service Mutuals: Towards a Theoretical 
Understanding of the Spin-Out Process, Policy & Politics, The Policy Press, 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/147084414X13988685244243). 
 
Huxham, C., (2003), Theorising collaboration practice, Public Management Review, 5(3), pp. 
401–23. 
 
Kellett, J., Humphrey, R., and Sleeth, R., (2006) ‘Empathy and the emergence of task and 
relations leaders’.  The Leadership Quarterly, 17, pp. 146-162. 
 
Kets de Vries, M. F. R., (2006), The spirit of despotism: Understanding the tyrant within, 
Human Relations, 59, pp. 195–220. 
 
Lazar, R., (2003), Knowing hatred, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 84, pp. 405–
425. 
 
Martin, S.J., (2010), ‘From new public management to networked community governance? 
Strategic local public service networks in England’. In Osborne, S.P. (ed.), The new public 
governance: Emerging perspectives on the theory and practice of public governance, 
London: Routledge, pp. 337–48. 
 
Miles, M.B. and Huberman, A.M.  (1994), ‘Data management and analysis methods’. In 
Denzin, N. and Yvonna S. (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research, Sage, Thousand Oaks, 
CA, pp.428–44. 
 
Mosley, J.E., Maronick, M.P. and Katz, H. (2012) How organisational characteristics affect 
the adaptive tactics used by human service non-profit managers confronting financial 
uncertainty, Non-profit Management & Leadership, 22(3), pp. 281-303.  
 
Pearce J., (2006) Learning from Failure: Lessons in How to Strengthen and Build the Social 
Enterprise Sector, Co-active Ltd, Plymouth 
 
Pelzer, P., (2005), Contempt and organization: Present in practice, ignored by research? 
Organization Studies, 26, pp. 1217–1228. 
 
Plutchik, R., 1987) ‘Evolutionary bases of empathy’. In Empathy and Its Development, (ed. N 
Eisenberg, J Strayer: 3–46). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Riessman, C.K., (1993), Narrative Analysis, Sage, Newbury Park, CA. 
 
Roche, W.K., (2009), Who Gains from Workplace Partnership, International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, 20(1), pp. 1-33. 
 
Rose, A., (1994), Legal Implication of Partnering, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 53(1), pp. 36–42. 
 
26 
 
Sims, D., (2005), You bastard: A narrative exploration of the experience of indignation 
within organizations, Organization Studies, 26, pp. 1625–1640. 
 
Sheard, A.G. and Kakabadse, A.P. (2002) From loose groups to effective teams: The nine key 
factors of the team landscape, Journal of Management Development, 22(2), 133-151. 
 
Spear, R., Cornforth, C., and Aiken, M. (2009) The Governance Challenges of Social 
Enterprises: Evidence from a UK Empirical Study. Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics, 80(2), pp. 247–273. 
 
Steijn, B., Klijn, E.H. & Edelenbos, J., (2011), Public Private Partnerships: Added Value by 
Organisational Form or Management? Public Administration, 89(4), pp. 1235-1252. 
 
Vince, R. & Mizen, A., (2014), Violent innocence: A contradiction at the heart of leadership, 
Organisation Studies, 35(2), pp. 189-207. 
 
Weick, K. E. (1995) Sense-making in Organisations, London: Sage. 
 
Weiner, B.J., Alexander, J.A. & Zuckerman, H.S., (2000), Strategies for Effective 
Management Participation in Community Health Partnerships, Health Care Management 
Review, 25(3), pp. 48–66. 
 
Whitehead, M., (2007), The architecture of partnerships: Urban communities in the shadow 
of hierarchy, Policy & Politics, 35(1), pp. 3–23. 
 
Wolf, S., Pescosolido, A., and Druskat, V., (2002) ‘Emotional intelligence as the basis of 
leadership emergence in self-managing teams’.  Leadership Quarterly, 13, pp. 505-522. 
